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FIVE JUSTICES HAVE TRANSFORMED THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT’S FREEDOM OF RELIGION TO  





The religion clauses in the First Amendment prohibit any 
governmental interference with individuals’ “free exercise” of reli-
gion and prohibit government from “establishment of religion.”1  One 
would think that these clauses are clear in (i) guaranteeing to all the 
right to freely exercise the individual’s chosen religion, to the same 
unlimited extent that the accompanying First Amendment clause 
guarantees “freedom of speech,” and (ii) mandating that government 
take no sides among the various religions through prohibiting any re-
ligion from being the Government’s chosen “establishment of reli-
gion.”2 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court rejected such clarity.  
Many Court opinions and opinions by individual Justices express one 
reality: nothing is clear on what these clauses mean, as far as some 
recent Supreme Court Justices are concerned.  An almost unanimous 
(with one dissenting Justice) Court opinion in 1971 admitted: 
Candor compels acknowledgement . . . that we can on-
ly dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this ex-
traordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. . . .  
A law “respecting” the proscribed result, that is, the 
establishment of religion, is not always easily identifi-
 
 Mr. Gerald Walpin is author of The Supreme Court vs. The Constitution (Significance Press 
2013) and served, by appointment by President G.W. Bush and confirmation by the Senate, 
as a Federal Inspector General.  Before that, he practiced law in New York, where, for over 
20 years, he was listed in each compilation of Best Lawyers in America. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2 Id. 
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able as one violative of the Clause.3 
While some Justices have simplistically summarized these 
clauses as creating a “wall of separation between Church and State,”4 
the Court has rejected such rule by describing any line of separation 
as “blurred, indistinct, and variable,”5 a description at least twice reit-
erated.6  Indeed, the Court, more recently, candidly described its de-
cisions on the Establishment Clause as “Januslike,”
 
or two-faced.7  In 
one 5-4 opinion, the Court declared, “total separation of the two 
[Church and State] is not possible,” and, more to the heart of the is-
sue, that the Constitution does not “require complete separation of 
church and state.”8  The lack of consistency in Court rulings led four 
dissenters, in one case, to frustratingly comment that stare decisis has 
been overruled by the willingness of the Court “to alter its analysis 
from Term to Term in order to suit its preferred results.”9  In addition, 
the majority in one decision proudly threw Establishment Clause 
stare decisis to the junk heap, by extolling the Court’s lack of con-
sistency as “sacrific[ing] clarity and predictability for flexibility”10—
thereby admitting their failure to declare a rule of law that would—
indeed, should—overcome personal views of individual Justices.11 
It is therefore not surprising that one Justice recognized that 
Court rulings have provided no consistent guidance on the meaning 
of the Establishment Clause: Justice Clarence Thomas wrote that it 
was time for the Court “to begin the process of rethinking the Estab-
lishment Clause.”12  What is surprising is that all nine Justices did not 
join in that direction, given the inconsistent and irrational decisions 
the Court has rendered, examples of which I will now spotlight. 
 
3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
4 E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing TP, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Jefferson’s 
“wall of separation between Church and State” (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1878)));  see infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Reynolds decision that, despite the reference to Jefferson’s “wall of separation” phrase, in 
fact, recognized God. 
5 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614. 
6 Id.; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
7 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005). 
8 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-73 (1984). 
9 Id. at 699 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
10 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
11 Id. 
12 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). 
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II. THE COURT HAS CREATED IRRECONCILABLE RULINGS 
Examples of these rulings are as follows: 
 A State-composed 22-word prayer, carefully non-sectarian, 
simply recognizing God and praying for God’s blessings, to be 
used in schools, is unconstitutional,13 while, a daily prayer in the 
legislature, given by a sectarian chaplain paid for by taxpayers’ 
money, is constitutional.14 
 The Court held unconstitutional a State requirement that 10 Bi-
ble verses, chosen by the student reading them, be read each day, 
followed by the Lord’s Prayer and the Flag Salute,15 because, as 
Justice William J. Brennan wrote, “it placed the ‘power, prestige 
and financial support of government’ behind the prayer.”16  Yet, 
the Court recognized prayer as constitutional when the much 
greater “power, prestige, and financial support of government is 
placed behind” praying to God in all three branches of Govern-
ment:17 the President, in proclaiming a Thanksgiving Day on 
which all people are asked to pray to God; Congress, in daily 
prayers, often sectarian, voiced by a Chaplain paid with taxpay-
ers’ money; and the Supreme Court, in its daily opening prayer 
for God’s blessings.18 
 Even a “period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration,” 
which the students had the freedom to use “for meditation or 
voluntary prayer,” was declared unconstitutional,19 while the 
identical statute, except without words expressly authorizing 
students to use the time to pray—even though they could—was 
constitutional.20  The result: it was unconstitutional to inform 
students that they could exercise their constitutionally-
guaranteed “free exercise” of religion right for prayer during the 
moment of silence. 
 
13 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422, 425 (1962). 
14 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 785-87 (1983); Engel, 370 U.S. at 439-42 (Douglas, 
J., concurring), thus describing the Court’s decision in Engel. 
15 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 207 (1963). 
16 Id. at 264 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
17 Engel, 370 U.S. at 431. 
18 E.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 786-89 n.9 (1983) (mentioning, in apparent approval, pray-
ers in Supreme Court, in Congress, and in Presidential proclamations). 
19 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60-61 (with text of statute at id. 40 n.2). 
20 Id. at 40 n.1.  Appellees abandoned any claim that this statute was unconstitutional.  Id. 
at 40. 
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 The Court affirmed that high school students maintain their First 
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression,21 but a 
student, chosen by a vote of her fellow students to give a non-
denominational invocation at her school’s football game of a 
short prayer of gratitude to God, cannot do so as it was declared 
unconstitutional.22  The effect: a student may express her view, 
for example, for or against abortion (a subject affecting many re-
ligious people), but may not say “thanks to God.”  And that stu-
dent can express her gratitude to, for example, Locke, Rousseau, 
and Voltaire (or even any of Presidents Reagan, Clinton, Bush 
(either or both), or Obama), but, heaven forbid, not to God.
 23 
 It is unconstitutional for that student, chosen by vote of her fel-
low students, to give a short non-denominational prayer, on the 
ground that it communicates State endorsement of a prayer to 
God, despite the fact that it is a student, not the State, who de-
cides what she will say.  However, it is not an unconstitutional 
State endorsement of God in Presidential proclamations, Su-
preme Court opening prayers, and Congress’s opening prayers 
(that are often sectarian). 
 It is unconstitutional for a public middle or high school to invite 
a Rabbi to provide an invocation and benediction, both non-
sectarian, that, among similar comments, thanked God “[f]or the 
legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of 
minorities are protected,”24 while it is constitutional for each 
house of Congress to open each session with a prayer that is of-
ten sectarian. 
 It is unconstitutional for State officials to allow “a formal reli-
gious exercise at promotional and graduation ceremonies for 
secondary schools,”25 but it is constitutional for State officials to 
 
21 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
22 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 296, 317 (2000). 
23 The irrationality of the Supreme Court decision apparently caused the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit to reverse a district court, that, following Santa Fe, had enjoined a high 
school valedictorian from praying or calling on the audience to pray.  The Court of Appeals 
found it unlikely that it would appear that “individual prayers or other remarks to be given 
by students at graduation are, in fact, school-sponsored.”  Guillermo Contreras, Appeals 
Panel Overturns Medina Valley Graduation Prayer Ban, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS 
(June 4, 2011, 7:33 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Appeals-
panel-overturns-Medina-Valley-graduation-1408548.php. 
24 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-82, 599 (1992). 
25 Id. at 586-87. 
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direct that each Legislative session day be opened by a formal 
prayer voiced by a chaplain paid for with State funds, with the 
public, often schoolchildren, in attendance.26 
 The Court found constitutional State tax exemptions for real es-
tate held by religious organizations and used for religious wor-
ship,27 but held unconstitutional the exemption from sales and 
use taxes that a State granted for “[p]eriodicals . . . published . . . 
by a religious faith . . . consist[ing] wholly of writings promul-
gating the teaching of the faith . . . .”28 
 Inclusion of a crèche in a city’s Christmas season display in the 
City of Pawtucket was held constitutional,29 while a crèche in-
cluded in the Pittsburgh area Christmas display, five years later, 
was held unconstitutional.30  And, while holding the crèche un-
constitutional, that Court held constitutional an 18-foot Menorah 
(a Jewish symbol integral to its religious Hanukkah festival) that 
was included in the display.31 
 It is unconstitutional for a local government to post a banner 
reading “Glory to God in the Highest,” because it “is indisputa-
bly religious,”32 but “In God We Trust,” as a congressionally-
legislated “national motto,” and those words on all our money, 
 
26 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784-86. 
27 Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676, 679-80 (1970). 
28 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 
151.312 (1982)). 
29 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671-72. 
30 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 578, 602 
(1989).  In deciding that a crèche is constitutional in one Christmas display but not in anoth-
er, the Court often rests on its placement and the nature of other items in the display.  Id. at 
598.  Thus, in allowing the crèche in the Pawtucket display, the Court considered that, while 
it was life-size, with figures as large as five feet in height, the display had other “figures and 
decorations traditionally associated with Christmas,” including a Christmas tree, carolers, a 
clown, and hundreds of colored lights.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.  On the other hand, “the me-
norah is readily understood as simply a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional 
way of observing the winter-holiday season.”  Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 617 (Brennan, 
J., concurring).  This type of desiderata is no more relevant than a woman’s assertion that 
she is only slightly pregnant.  The Menorah, regardless of location, is a Jewish religious 
symbol, not accepted by other religions.  The nearby Christmas tree does not alter that reali-
ty; moreover, the tree is not an accepted “secular” symbol by many non-Christian Ameri-
cans.  That these decisions were made by split Courts, demonstrates the impossibility of de-
claring a rule of law based on such variables.  Decisions should rest on the fact that America 
is a religious nation that is proud to display its acceptance of and respect for all religions. 
31 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620-21. 
32 Id. at 598, 602. 
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are constitutional.33 
 “Bus transportation, school lunches, public health services, and 
secular textbooks supplied” to religious school students, as they 
are supplied to public school students, do not “offend the Estab-
lishment Clause,”34 but State reimbursement of religious schools 
for cost of salaries and textbooks used in secular subject teaching 
is unconstitutional.35 
 While it is constitutional for a State to pay for bus transportation 
of parochial school students to their parochial school,36 it is un-
constitutional for a State to pay for bus transportation—solely 
the cost of a non-sectarian bus and driver37—from the parochial 
school for a field trip to a natural history museum.38 
 It is constitutional for a State to reimburse a parochial school for 
the expense of administering State tests,39 but unconstitutional to 
reimburse the parochial school for the cost of administering tests 
on secular subjects,40 even though the school, acting in the letter 
of the authorizing statute, expressly prohibits any payment “for 
religious worship or instruction.”41 
 A State violates the Establishment Clause if it lends maps of the 
United States to a parochial school,42 but it is constitutional for a 
State to lend geography textbooks to the same school.43 
 “The Government may . . . finance a hospital though it is run by 
a religious order,”44 but the Court, relying, in part, on “the role of 
teaching nuns in enhancing the religious atmosphere,” disal-
 
33 Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243-44 (9th Cir. 1970).  The Supreme Court, 
although asked, declined to review the decision.  Four other Courts of Appeals, asked to con-
sider the constitutionality of “In God We Trust,” have also ruled its use constitutional.  Myra 
Adams, Federal Court Rules “In God We Trust” Will Remain on Coins and Currency, 
REDSTATE (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:53 PM), http://www.redstate.com/diary/6755mm/2013/09/13/ 
federal-court-rules-in-god-we-trust-will-remain-on-coins-and-currency/. 
34 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616-17. 
35 Id. at 620-21. 
36 Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. 
37 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 253-54. 
39 Regan, 444 U.S. at 657. 
40 Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 479-82 (1973). 
41 Id. at 477. 
42 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365-66 (1975). 
43 Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968). 
44 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing the Court’s opinion in Brad-
field v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-99 (1899)). 
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lowed State financing of secular matters at a religious school.45  
Of course, given the “free exercise” clause, in public schools, 
some Jewish teachers wear yarmulkes (head covering), some 
Christian teachers wear crosses, and some Muslim teachers wear 
head coverings, without any attempts to halt such endorsement 
of religion. 
 It is constitutional for a State to provide speech and hearing di-
agnostic testing inside a parochial school,46 but it is unconstitu-
tional for the State to provide speech and hearing services inside 
a parochial school.47 
 It is constitutional for the State to provide a science book to pa-
rochial school students,48 but unconstitutional for the State to 
provide a science kit.49 
 It is unconstitutional for the State to allow public school premis-
es to be used for religious education, even for students so re-
questing with parental consent,50 but it is constitutional for the 
State to use its power and staff to enforce truancy laws to compel 
attendance by a public school student at religious education for 
which the student was released from public school with parental 
consent.51 
 It is unconstitutional for schools to post a copy of the Ten Com-
mandments in classrooms,52 but constitutional to have the Ten 
Commandments a permanent part of the Supreme Court cham-
ber,53 where millions of young people visiting the Court building 
will see it, and constitutional for a State to have a 6-foot high 
monolith inscribed with the Ten Commandments, as one of 17 




45 Id. at 615 (majority opinion). 
46 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 240-41. 
47 Meek, 421 U.S. at 372 (1975). 
48 Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-45. 
49 Wolman, 433 U.S. at 249. 
50 Illinois v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cnty., Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 207-
08, 212 (1948). 
51 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952). 
52 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
53 Courtroom Friezes: South and North Walls, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (May 8, 2003), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/northandsouthwalls.pdf. 
54 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, 691-92. 
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How did the Supreme Court jurisprudence reach such disar-
ray?  It is necessary to understand the full history of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence to learn how and why the Court took these in-
consistent turns, and whether the Court was correct in reaching this 
point. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE 
CLAUSES 
Justice Brennan, voting to hold unconstitutional Bible reading 
in classrooms, candidly admitted that “Madison and Jefferson,” 
whom he described as “the architects of the First Amendment,”55 may 
have “held such [Bible reading in public schools] to be permissi-
ble.”56  That admission is telling, as the Court is supposed to be en-
forcing the First Amendment as written.  If the principal movers of 
the First Amendment understood that it permitted that entry of reli-
gion into public school classrooms, on what basis did late twentieth 
century Justices hold that the same, unchanged First Amendment 
prohibited it? 
To understand the meaning of the Religion Clauses, it is nec-
essary to examine, inter alia, the words chosen, the drafters’ views on 
their meanings, how those who voted for the Amendment and their 
contemporaries applied it, and how the Supreme Court itself con-
strued them during the first century of the Religion Clauses’ inclusion 
in the Constitution. 
A. The Words Themselves 
The Establishment Clause prohibits any “law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”57  Significantly, it could have been, but 
was not, written to prohibit any law supporting or favoring a belief in 
God, and religion generally, as many a Court majority has recently 
 
55 While Madison is correctly cited as the architect of the Religion Clauses, Justice Bren-
nan was in error in suggesting that Jefferson played a critical role in the framing of the First 
Amendment.  Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 234 (Brennan, J., concurring).  Jefferson 
was in France at the time the Bill of Rights was drafted, discussed and passed in Congress, 
as he did not return until thereafter in October 1789.  See The Thomas Jefferson Timeline 
1743-1827, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_ 
papers/mtjti me3a.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015).   
56 Id. at 235. 
57 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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construed it.58 
We must therefore start our attempt to understand the Estab-
lishment Clause with the meaning of “an establishment.”  The first 
American dictionary provided the definition: “the act of establishing, 
founding, ratifying or ordaining.”59  Synonyms provided today are 
“foundation, institution, formation, inception, creation, installation, 
inauguration, start, initiation.”60  None of these definitions or syno-
nyms readily encompasses simple support, particularly if any support 
is offered without favoring any one religion.  Nor can one reasonably 
construe “an establishment” to include simply a belief in God, given 
the recognized multiple choices of a religion to recognize God, thus 
precluding the “establishment” of any one religion. 
In defining “an establishment,” we cannot ignore the immedi-
ate concurrent guaranty of freedom to exercise religion, alongside the 
other guaranteed freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and petition.  
Excluding an immediate threat to public safety, freedom of speech 
and press has been understood to preclude censoring of the opinions 
of a speaker or writer.61  The authors’ inclusion of free exercise of re-
ligion as one of a series of freedoms, including freedom of speech, 
thus defined by the Court, strongly suggests that the same parameters 
be applied to free exercise of religion.  That identity of definition was 
recognized by the Court when it held that each freedom in the First 
Amendment must be equally enforced.62  Yet, as noted, the Court in 
recent years has applied the Establishment Clause to prohibit a stu-
dent, chosen by her classmates, to include her opinion that God 
should be thanked for the blessings that they have,63 thus violating 
both her “free exercise” and “free speech” rights. 
 
58 E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality . . . between religion and non-religion.”). 
59 1 N. WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (quoted in 
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
60 Google search “Establishment,” GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid 
=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF8#q=establishment (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
61 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300, 304, 306 (1940) (rejects “previous re-
straint” in favor of exercise of free speech right in a religious context); see also Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1964) (“constitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do not per-
mit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy,” absent directly leading to “imminent lawless 
action”), and Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (explaining that this is a right of students as well, as 
long as the student’s speech does not cause “material and substantial” disturbance of school 
activities). 
62 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 50; see generally infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text. 
63 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 301. 
9
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B. Contemporaneous Understanding of the Meaning 
The wording of the initial proposal, by both Virginia and 
North Carolina, for the Bill of Rights guaranty on religious liberty: 
[A]ll men have an equal, natural and unalienable right 
to the free exercise of religion, according to the dic-
tates of conscience, and . . . no particular religious sect 
or society ought to be favored or established, by law, 
in preference to others.64 
Two other States, New York and Rhode Island, made a similar pro-
posal,65 with both Virginia and Rhode Island adding an express 
recognition of “the duty which we owe our Creator.”66  Madison’s 
proposed language in Congress for the Religion Clauses was as fol-
lows: 
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account 
of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national 
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal 
rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pre-
text, infringed.67 
Significantly, the language of each of these proposals expressed the 
aim to prevent favoring any one religion over other religions; each 
was devoid of any prohibition of favoring equally all religious sects 
over non-religion, or of prayers to God, and, as noted, at least two 
States expressly recognizing the Country’s continuing duty to God. 
After the language proposed by Madison returned to Congress 
from the Committee of The Whole, debate in Congress and changes 
thereafter made in the text before adoption further support that no 
prohibition of recognition of God was ever intended.  Two Con-
gressmen, Messrs. Huntington and Sylvester, respectively, voiced 
fear “that the words might be taken in such latitude as to be extreme-
ly hurtful to the cause of religion,” and “fear[] it might be thought to . 
. . abolish religion altogether.”68  Madison attempted to assuage such 
fears by explaining that the proposed amendment was not intended to 
abolish religion nor worship of God, but “[t]hat Congress should not 
 
64 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (1836); 4 id. at 244. 
65 1 id. at 328, 334. 
66 Id.; 3 id. at 659. 
67 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
68 Id. at 757-58. 
10
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establish a religion . . . nor compel men to worship God in any man-
ner contrary to their conscience.”69  Madison thus made clear that the 
amendment would not prohibit worship of God, a prohibition he ne-
gated by carefully including “in any manner contrary to their con-
science,”70 thereby upholding the worship of God in any manner that 
is consistent with a person’s conscience.  Further in a dialogue con-
cerning any fear that the Establishment Clause, as proposed, would 
deny Government involvement in the worship of God, Madison spe-
cifically offered a semantic change (which was decided to be unnec-
essary) to ensure that no one could construe the Clause “to patronize 
those who professed no religion at all.”71  Madison thereby made ex-
plicit that he never intended the Establishment Clause to bar Gov-
ernmental praise of, and prayer to, God. 
After much discussion, the House proposal, sent to the Senate, 
included a prohibition against any “law establishing religion.”  Its 
metamorphosis into the final adopted language demonstrates the in-
tent only to prohibit the establishment of any one religion as the ap-
proved religion but not prohibit helping and indiscriminately recog-
nizing religion and God.  The Senate initially substituted: “Congress 
shall make no law establishing one religious sect or society in prefer-
ence to others, nor shall the right of conscience be infringed.”72  The 
Final Senate proposal, forwarded to the Conference Committee, read: 
“Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode 
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion.”73  All of 
these proposals demonstrate that the understood purpose of the Reli-
gion Clauses was to prohibit the choice of any one religion or sect as 
the approved or favored “mode” to praise God, and that no proposal 
implied a separation of the Country from God. 
The placement of “an” before “establishment” was Madison’s 
way of making clear that the object of the Religion Clauses was, as 
Madison summarized his understanding of their meanings: to prevent 
“that one sect . . . obtain a pre-eminence, or two combined together, 
and establish a religion to which they would compel others to con-
form.”74 
 
69 Id. at 758 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1789). 
73 Id. at 77. 
74 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730-31. 
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In a letter Madison wrote in 1822, he reconciled such gov-
ernmental “religious” actions as Thanksgiving proclamations and 
payment of Chaplains for Congress, by pointing out that these actions 
were “absolutely indiscriminate”75 among religions, following the ob-
jective “that all Sects might be safely & advantageously put on a 
footing of equal & entire freedom.”76  Madison thus again made clear 
that Government praise of, or a prayer to, God, and non-
discriminatory aid to any and all religious sects were consistent with 
his Religion Clauses. 
In his first inaugural address, Madison reaffirmed his under-
standing of the Establishment Clause: while it prevented government 
“interference with the right of conscience or the functions of reli-
gion,”77 it did not prevent Government homage and prayers to God.  
Indeed, as part of that talk, Madison placed his “confidence” “in the 
guardianship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose power reg-
ulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings have been so conspicu-
ously dispensed to this rising Republic, and to whom we are bound to 
address our devout gratitude . . . .”78  Significantly, he also beseeched 
all Americans to pray to God with “our fervent supplications and best 
hopes for the future.”79  That Madison, the prime author of the Estab-
lishment Clause, so explained it to the American people, is as close to 
conclusive on its meaning as can be found; no one can reconcile 
binding this Country to God with an interpretation of the Religion 
Clauses as separating this Country from God. 
While Thomas Jefferson, as noted, being in Europe, was ab-
sent from the debates on the Bill of Rights, his views, expressed prior 
to these debates, suggest that, at least at that time, he agreed that the 
Religion Clauses prohibited favoritism and support of one religious 
sect, while allowing Governmental recognition of God and support of 
all religious sects equally.  First, we know that Jefferson drafted the 
Declaration of Independence that, unabashedly, recognized God sev-
eral times as the source of the human rights that motivated the birth 
of this Country.80  But even more telling, in 1785, Jefferson authored 
 
75 Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions66.html. 
76 Id. 
77 President James Madison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), available at 
http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-james-madison-1809. 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Id. 
80 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“God”); id. at para. 2 (“en-
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The Virginia Act For Establishing Religious Freedom, that opened 
with recognition of “Almighty God, . . . being Lord, both of body and 
mind . . . his Almighty power.”81  That Virginia antecedent contained 
the substance of what later was codified in the Constitution’s Reli-
gion Clauses: “no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, ministry whatsoever . . . .”82  Therefore, at 
least at the time the Religion Clauses were adopted, Jefferson, having 
included homage to God in his earlier Virginia provision, understood 
the aim of the Establishment Clause progeny to prohibit the favoring 
of one religion over another, but not require Governmental rejection 
of God. 
The two recognized experts on the meaning of the Constitu-
tion also understood the Religion Clauses as Madison described 
them.  Justice Joseph Story, who served on the Supreme Court from 
1811 to 1845 and wrote the still-accepted treatise on the Constitution, 
explained that the “real object of the [Establishment Clause] was . . . 
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should 
give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern-
ment.”83  Likewise, Thomas Cooley, in his 1868 treatise on the Con-
stitution, after declaring that the Religion Clauses prohibited gov-
ernment aid to a particular religion, explained the meaning of the 
Religion Clauses: 
[T]he American constitutions contain no provisions 
which prohibit the authorities from such solemn 
recognition of a superintending Providence in public 
transactions and exercises as the general religious sen-
timent of mankind inspires. . . .  [A]ll must 
acknowledge the fitness of recognizing in important 
human affairs the superintending care and control of 
the Great Governor of the Universe, and of acknowl-
edging with thanksgiving his boundless favors.”84 
 
dowed by [all men’s] Creator”); id. at para. 32 (“reliance on the protection of Divine Provi-
dence”). 
81 VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (1786). 
82 Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, VIRGINIA HISTORICAL 
SOCIETY, http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explorer/tho 
mas-jefferson (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
83 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A 
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, 
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 728 (1833). 
84 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 105 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A 
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Both Story’s and Cooley’s relatively contemporaneous nine-
teenth century explanations of the Religion Clauses’ meanings re-
quire rejection of a total separation from God and religion interpreta-
tion that has been asserted by some more recent Justices. 
C. Early Applications of the Religion Clauses 
The Supreme Court has frequently reiterated that, to ascertain 
the meaning of a constitutional provision, “the history of the times in 
the midst of which the provision was adopted,”85 and acts of those 
who enacted a constitutional provision and of those who acted under 
the new provision are the best “historical evidence” of “what the 
draftsmen intended the [provision] to mean.”86  Renowned Justice Ol-
iver Wendell Holmes well expressed this rule of construction: words 
of the Constitution must be read in “a sense most obvious to the 
common understanding at the time of its adoption.”87 
There is substantial, totally one-sided, best “historical evi-
dence.”  The same week that Congress voted approval of the First 
Amendment for submission to the States, Congress voted to appoint 
and finance a chaplain for each House.88  Madison, the prime author 
and proponent of the Religion Clauses, voted for this government-
financing of religion and assumed responsibility of instituting the 
Chaplain in the House.89  Also in that week, Congress voted to re-
quest the President to set aside a Thanksgiving Day to acknowledge 
“the many signal favors of Almighty God.”90  These acts by the Con-
gress that proposed the Religion Clauses can be reconciled only with 
an understanding of those Clauses as permitting Government recogni-
tion of God, as well as recognition of and help to religion, as long as 
no one sect was favored over others. 
Madison’s actions and pronouncements after the enactment of 
the First Amendment demonstrate that he continued to regard recog-
nition of God and Government assistance to religion, as long as not 
 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON LEGISLATIVE POWER OF 
THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 470-71 (1868)). 
85 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). 
86 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790; accord Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 
(1888), overruled in part by Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
87 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
88 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790. 
89 Id. at 788 n.8. 
90 Id. at 788 n.9. 
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favoring a single religion, to be consistent with the Religion Clauses.  
And Jefferson, in many ways, endorsed that construction of the 
Amendment. 
Both Jefferson and Madison, in their capacities as members of 
the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia, a State Universi-
ty, made no objection to the University policy under which students 
are “expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of their 
respective sects” that are invited to “establish within, or adjacent to, 
the precincts of the University.”91  Both, when President, regularly 
attended church services in the House of Representatives, and ap-
proved the use of other government buildings for church services; the 
use of the House chamber for church services continued as late as 
186892 —use of public buildings for church services that some feder-
al courts have recently held to be barred under the Establishment 
Clause.93 
Madison, as had Presidents George Washington and John Ad-
ams94 before him, issued Proclamations.  His Proclamation recom-
mended “to all who should be piously disposed . . . in their respective 
religious congregations” to join in “adorations to the Great Parent and 
Sovereign of the Universe . . .  for the many blessings He has be-
stowed on the people of the United States.”95  Madison also quoted 
Isaiah 2:4, on “beat[ing] our swords into plowshares.96  It is worth-
while to focus again on the end to Madison’s First Inaugural Address, 
which could not have been voiced by him if he had thought that the 
Religion Clauses—for which he was primarily responsible—
separated Government from God: 
 
91 Minutes, Board of Visitors, University of Virginia (Oct. 4, 1824), available at 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-02-02-02-0305.  
Although that was done before the Fourteenth Amendment was held to apply the Bill of 
Rights to State action, Virginia, at that time, had a State religion clause, substantially similar 
to the Religion Clauses in the First Amendment. 
92 Religion and the Founding of the American Republic: Religion and the Federal Gov-
ernment, Part II, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06-2.html 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
93 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
94 Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 1789-1815: George Washington, John Ad-
ams, James Madison, PILGRIM HALL MUSEUM, http://www.pilgrimhallmuseum. 
org/pdf/TG_Presidential_Thanksgiving_Proclamations_1789_1815.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 
2015). 
95 President James Madison, Proclamation on Day of Public Humiliation and Prayer (July 
23, 1813), available at http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3622. 
96 Id. 
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[W]e have all been encouraged to feel in the guardian-
ship and guidance of that Almighty Being whose pow-
er regulates the destiny of nations, whose blessings 
have been so conspicuously dispensed to this rising 
Republic, and to whom we are bound to address our 
devout gratitude for the past, as well as our fervent 
supplications and best hopes for the future.97 
It is simply impossible to reconcile this supplication to God by the 
author and prime mover of the Religion Clauses with a conclusion 
that those Clauses created a wall of separation between Government 
and God.  Madison preceded this clear attachment between the Gov-
ernment/Country and God with his view of what the Religion Clauses 
prohibited: “the slightest interference with the right of conscience or 
the functions of religion,” the latter of which he said was “so wisely 
exempted from civil jurisdiction” by the First Amendment98 – not a 
belief in God. 
While Jefferson was the sole President99 not to issue a 
Thanksgiving Proclamation, he otherwise referred to “our country” as 
“rall[ying] to the unity of the Creator.”100  Further, in his two inaugu-
ral addresses, he affirmed the nation’s “acknowledging and adoring 
an overruling providence,”101 and asked the Nation “to join [him] in 
supplications” to God.102  Properly read, Jefferson’s often quoted, but 
misused, “wall of separation between Church and State,” to describe 
the Religion Clauses, simply distinguished between choice of religion 
as a vehicle to God—a choice that is separated from the State—and 
belief in and prayer to God, which is not separated from the State.  
This conclusion of what Jefferson intended by his “wall of separa-
 
97 President James Madison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1809), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25805. 
98 Id. (emphasis added). 
99 Jefferson did issue a Thanksgiving Proclamation while he was Governor of Virginia, 
while that State had a provision akin to the Establishment Clause.  Thomas Jefferson, Proc-
lamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779), available at 
http://www.lifenews.com/2013/11/28/thomas-jeffersons-thanksgiving-and-prayer-
proclamation/. 
100 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Timothy Pickering, Esq. (Feb. 27, 1821), in THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, 
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 211 (1854). 
101 President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp. 
102 President Thomas Jefferson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1805), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau2.asp. 
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tion” comment is supported by many of Jefferson’s own words.  
First, we have Jefferson’s recognition of and prayers to God in his in-
augural addresses, quoted above.  In addition, in 1802, while Presi-
dent, he distinguished between “religion” that “lies . . . between man 
& his God,” as to which the Government should “make no law,” and 
God itself, as to whom the proscription did not apply.103 
Significantly, Jefferson also did not find that the Religion 
Clauses barred him from using his government powers to help reli-
gion.  Thus, in the 1803 treaty with the Kaskaskia Tribe that he 
signed and asked the Senate to ratify, he agreed that “the United 
States will give annually for seven years one hundred dollars towards 
the support of a priest of [the Catholic] religion . . . .  And . . . the 
sum of the three hundred dollars to assist the said tribe in the erection 
of a church.”104  Jefferson proposed three similar laws and treaties be-
tween 1802 and 1807.105  These actions by Jefferson, totally at odds 
with a contrary interpretation of the slogan that he wrote of separa-
tion between church and state, speak loudly of Jefferson’s rejection 
of the total separation—including from God—that some attempt to 
attribute to him. 
Actions by Washington and Adams, the first two Presidents 
charged with enforcing the Religion Clauses, are also obviously pro-
bative of the meaning of those Clauses.  Both Presidents were in-
volved in their adoption.  There is no basis to charge either with in-
tentional violation of the Bill of Rights when they each issued very 
clear endorsements of God.  Rather, the only fair construction of 
what they each did was that they believed it was consistent with the 
Religion Clauses. 
Washington, while President, defined the Religion Clauses by 
repeatedly not separating himself, and thus the State, from belief in 
God and the Bible.  Washington’s conduct during his first inaugura-
tion dramatically demonstrated the Presidency’s connection with 
God: Asked to swear to the oath required by Article II, section 1, of 
the Constitution, which contained no reference to God, he sua sponte 
added, after so swearing, “So help me God,” and bent forward to kiss 
 
103 President Thomas Jefferson, Draft Reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (on or 
before Dec. 31, 1801), available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-
documents/draft-reply-danbury-baptist-association 
104 Treaty with the Kaskaskia, Aug. 13, 1803, art. 3, 7 Stat. 78 (1803), in 2 INDIAN 
AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 67-68 (1904). 
105 Id. at 77-78 (Treaty with the Wyandot (July 4, 1805)); id. at 90-92 (Treaty with the 
Cherokee (Jan. 7, 1806)). 
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the Bible on which he had placed his hand during the oath taking.106  
In 1790—after the Religion Clauses had been sent to the States for 
ratification—he visited Newport, Rhode Island and listened to, 
among others, a representative of the first Jewish Congregation.  He 
expressly demonstrated, in his subsequent letter to that Congregation, 
that, while affirming the Country’s guaranty of religious liberty, he 
did not hesitate to invoke and quote the Bible as the Government’s 
guidance for equal treatment of all religions.107  In his farewell ad-
dress, five years after the Bill of Rights had been ratified, Washing-
ton made explicit his understanding that “religion” was “indispensa-
ble” to the Country’s “prosperity,” and one of the “firmest props of 
the duties of men and citizens.”108  To emphasize his belief, he “be-
seech[ed] the Almighty” for assistance.109 
Adams, our second President, emphasized the Country’s reli-
ance on God by seeking “national acknowledgement” of the “truth” 
that the “safety and prosperity” of the Country “depend on the protec-
tion and blessing of Almighty God,” and for all Americans to join 
him in prayer for God’s “inestimable favor and heavenly benedic-
tion.”110  He also wrote that “[o]ur Constitution was made . . . for a . . 
. religious people”–a statement that would be hard to reconcile with 
the view that our Constitution separated our Government and people 
as a whole from invocation of God and religion.111  That this state-
ment was uttered by President Adams, who had been President of the 
Senate when that body approved the Bill of Rights, is irreconcilable 
with any suggestion that the Religion Clauses intended any such sep-
aration. 
Within less than 50 years of the ratification of the First 
Amendment, Congress endorsed and implemented the Washing-
ton/Adams/Madison view that Government was not barred from aid-
 
106 MICHAEL RICCARDS, A REPUBLIC, IF YOU CAN KEEP IT: THE FOUNDATION OF THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1700-1800, at 73-74 (Praeger, 1st ed. 1987). 
107 President George Washington, Letter to the Jews of Newport (Aug. 18, 1790), availa-
ble at http://www.tourosynagogue.org/index.php/history-learning/gw-letter. 
108 President George Washington, Farewell Address (1796), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. 
109 Id. 
110 President John Adams, Proclamation 8 - Recommending a National Day of Humilia-
tion, Fasting, and Prayer (Mar. 23, 1798), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb. 
edu/ws/?pid=65661. 
111 President John Adams, Message to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Divi-
sion of the Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS (LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS 1799-1811), at 281 (1854). 
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ing religion and God.  For example, Congress in 1833 materially aid-
ed religion by at least two separate statutes.  First, it authorized the 
State of Ohio to sell “all or any part of the land heretofore reserved 
and appropriated by Congress for the support of religion within the 
Ohio Company’s . . . purchases . . . and to invest the money arising 
from the sale thereof . . . the proceeds of which shall be for ever an-
nually applied . . . for the support of religion . . . and for no use or 
other purpose whatsoever.”112  Then Congress enacted a law granting 
to a Jesuit College, “lots in the City of Washington . . . and directing 
the College to sell the lots and invest the proceeds . . . to establish and 
endow such professorships as it saw fit.”113 
Evidence also exists that States, in ratifying the First Amend-
ment, viewed it as consistent with continued Government and Ameri-
ca’s reliance on God.  Maryland, the second State to ratify it, on De-
cember 19, 1789,114 is a good example.  It would have been 
unthinkable for Maryland to have ratified Religion Clauses diametri-
cally opposite from the declaration of government’s relationship to 
God and religion that Maryland had in its Constitution, that “it is the 
duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he thinks most 
acceptable to him . . . [with] no person . . . molested . . . on account of 
his religious persuasion.”115 
These acts and statements by those who caused and lived 
through the adoption of the Religion Clauses are the best evidence 
that those Clauses were never intended to withdraw Government and 
our Country’s leaders from any relationship to or aid of religion and 
God.  Rather, they were intended solely to prevent governmental dis-
crimination among the various religious sects and the establishment 
or favoring of any one sect to the detriment of all others. 
 
112 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 858 n.3 (1995) (citing 
Act of Feb. 20, 1833, ch. 42, 4 Stat. 618-19) (emphasis added). 
113 Id. (citing Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 86, 6 Stat. 538) (internal quotations omitted).  
While I grant that, in retrospect, this might raise questions on Federal assistance to a single 
religious institution, and would thus warrant a detailed examination of the context and rele-
vant facts surrounding the enactment, it clearly establishes a governmental outlook that did 
not shy away from such assistance, and did not simply accept a total separation rule. 
114 Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, U.S. CONSTITUTION ONLINE, 
http://www.usconstitution.net/constamr at.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
115 MD. CONST. art. XXXVI (emphasis added). 
19
Walpin: Freedom from Religion
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
206 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
D. Religious Conduct of Subsequent Government 
Leaders and Institutions 
All subsequent Presidents, both Houses of Congress, and the 
Supreme Court continued the practice of recognizing and appealing 
to God.  Congress, in 1865, declared “it shall be lawful . . . to cause 
the motto ‘In God we trust’ to be placed upon such coins hereafter to 
be issued,” and, thereafter, most minted coins and printed bills con-
tained the same words.116  In 1954, Congress amended the statute-
created text of the pledge of allegiance to add “under God,”117 ex-
plaining, in the House Report accompanying the proposal, that from 
“our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected 
the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental 
belief in God.”118  In 1956, by joint resolution of Congress and the 
President’s signature, “In God We Trust” became the official Nation-
al Motto.119  Various States, including some that ratified the First 
Amendment, and others that later joined the Union, adopted a State 
Motto reflecting belief in God.  Connecticut, when it became a State, 
only seven years before the First Amendment was ratified, chose the 
motto (in Latin): “God, who transplanted us hither, will support 
us.”120  Other examples of State Mottos: Arizona: “God Enriches;” 
Colorado: “Nothing without Providence;” Florida: “In God We 
Trust;” Ohio: “With God All Things Are Possible”; and South Dako-
ta: “Under God the People Rule.”121 
Examples of renowned Presidents, following Madison, who 
continued the practice of recognizing God: Lincoln, in his 1865 Sec-
ond Inaugural Address, made repeated references to God, including 
“with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right.”122  
Woodrow Wilson, in his 1917 request to Congress for a Declaration 
of War against Germany, concluded his talk with the prayer that, with 
 
116 H.R. Res. 807, 38th Cong. § 5 (1865). 
117 H.R.J. Res. 243, 83d Cong (1954). 
118 H.R. Rep. No. 83-1693 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340. 
119 History of 'In God We Trust,' U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury. 
gov/about/education/Pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
120 Connecticut State Motto, NETSTATE, http://www.netstate.com/states/mottoes/ct_motto. 
htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
121 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 36 (O’Connor, J., concurring); State Mottoes, 
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0801718.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
122 President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln2.asp. 
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the help of God, this country would win.123  Franklin Roosevelt, in 
his 1933 First Inaugural address, voiced three prayers to God: “[W]e 
humbly ask the blessing of God;” “[m]ay He protect each and every 
one of us”; and “[m]ay He guide me in the days to come.”124  In his 
most famous Four Freedoms speech on January 6, 1941, President 
Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated his understanding of the Religion 
Clauses: “freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way”—well stating that the First Amendment was not intended to ex-
clude worship of God, but only to prohibit Government interference 
in each individual’s choice of religion to engage in that worship.125  
General (later President) Dwight Eisenhower concluded his “Order of 
the Day” to the U.S. and allied military on the D-Day invasion of 
France with: “[L]et us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon 
this great and noble undertaking.”126  All Presidents after Madison 
similarly in—but not limited to—Thanksgiving proclamations, asked 
all Americans for prayers to God.127  If, as noted, some more recent 
Justices have declared that the Government must remain neutral be-
tween believers and non-believers, each of our Presidents would have 
had to be held to have acted unconstitutionally.  I suggest that there is 
no basis to indict all these elected Presidents for violating the Reli-
gion Clauses of our Constitution; they each correctly believed, based 
on the historical facts, that recognition of and prayers to God were 
consistent with the First Amendment. 
The Supreme Court once explained the obvious: “[A] solemn 
avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Al-
mighty . . . has always been religious.”128  It gave that reason for bar-
ring prayers from public schools.  How is that ruling reconcilable 
with the Supreme Court’s repeated declaration that “[w]e are a reli-
 
123 See S. DOC. NO. 5 (1st Sess. 1917) (President Woodrow Wilson’s War Message to 
Congress on April 2, 1917); see also S.J. Res. 1, 65th Cong. (1917). 
124 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at 
http://www.inaugural.senate.gov/swearing-in/address/address-by-franklin-d-roosevelt-1933. 
125 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 6, 1941), available 
at http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/fdr-the-four-freedoms-speech-text. 
126 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, D-Day Statement to Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of 
the Allied Expeditionary Force! (June 6, 1944), available at http://www.archives.gov/histo-
rical-docs/doc-content/images/ww2-eisenhower-d-day-order.pdf. 
127 While, as noted, Jefferson was the sole President who declined to issue a Thanksgiving 
Proclamation, he did recognize God and helped, in certain circumstances, religion.  See En-
gel, 370 U.S. at 425; Marsh, 463 U.S. at 807. 
128 Engel, 370 U.S. at 424-25. 
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gious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being?”129  If 
our Country’s “institutions”—obviously including all three branches 
of Government—presuppose a Supreme Being, it cannot be unconsti-
tutional for those institutions to assist in recognizing that Supreme 
Being, particularly as a unanimous Court early held that the Constitu-
tion, including the Bill of Rights, “affirm and reaffirm that this is a 
religious nation.”130 
E. The Government Permanently Placed God in Its 
Capitol 
The presence of God, and symbols of most religions, perma-
nently installed in Washington, from early years of our Country, fur-
ther establish that the First Amendment was not understood to require 
a separation of God and religion (without favoritism) from Govern-
ment. 
Ironically, the Supreme Court—that has at times prohibited 
the Ten Commandments from being shown in or near government 
buildings—has multiple displays of religion.  Moses, with tablets rep-
resenting the Ten Commandments in Hebrew, is prominent inside the 
courtroom itself.131  Moses and the Ten Commandments are also on 
the exterior wall of the building, and representations of the Ten 
Commandments are on the metal gates on both sides of the court-
room, as well as on the doors into the courtroom.132  Another reli-
gious figure displayed in the Supreme Court is Mohammad holding 
the Qur’an depicted on the north wall.133 
The Capitol building twice highlights “In God We Trust,” and 
displays “Annuit coeptis” (translated: “God has favored our undertak-
ings”) over the east doorway of the Senate Chamber.134  Moreover, 
the Government, by concurrent resolution of the House and Senate in 
1954, created a special room in the Capitol (paid for with taxpayers’ 
money), set aside for prayer by members of Congress, well decorated 
 
129 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14; Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 213; Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 675. 
130 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470 (1892). 
131 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 688. 
132 These depictions are seen on viewing the Supreme Court building, and were described 
in Van Orden.  Id. 
133 Courtroom Friezes: South and North Walls, supra note 53. 
134 Explore Capitol Hill: Quotations, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL, http://www.aoc. 
gov/facts/quotations (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
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with pro-God and pro-religion depictions: a large stained glass panel 
depicting President Washington kneeling in prayer, surrounded by an 
etching of the first verse of the Sixteenth psalm: “Preserve me, O 
God, for in thee do I put my trust,” and the words above him of “This 
Nation Under God.”  A Bible is provided for use in the room.  And 
the brochure, created by Congress to explain the room’s decoration 
and purpose, describes it as depicting “the beauty of God’s world,” so 
as to make it “a shrine at which the individual may renew his faith in 
his God . . . .”135 
The east tip of the Washington Monument contains “Laus 
Deo,” which means “Praise be to God.”136  The Jefferson Memorial—
the memorial to the man often quoted by those who support the total 
separation of Government from God—contains many references to 
God: “Almighty God hath created the mind free;” “the plan of the Ho-
ly Author of our religion;” “God . . . gave us liberty”; and “God is 
just, that his justice cannot sleep forever.”137 
F. The First 150 Years of Supreme Court Rulings on 
the Religion Clauses 
In a 2005 Supreme Court opinion—214 years after the First 
Amendment was ratified and became the law of this land—holding 
unconstitutional a county’s display of the Ten Commandments, the 5-
Justice majority claimed stare decisis reliance limited to “some 60 
years of precedent taking neutrality [between God and religion, and 
the State] as its guiding principle.”138  Even assuming arguendo that 
assertion was correct,139 it would be an implicit admission that this 
position of total neutrality obtained no support in the Supreme Court 
during the first 154 years of the First Amendment that was ratified in 
1791.  In fact, the few relevant Supreme Court opinions during that 
first one-and-a-half centuries have to be ignored by the “neutrality” 
 
135 THE PRAYER ROOM IN THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL 4 (U.S. Printing Office 1956), 
available at http://contentdm.baylor.edu/cdm/ref/collection/cs-vert/id/11518. 
136 History & Culture, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/wamo/historyculture/in-
dex.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
137 Quotations on the Jefferson Memorial, MONTICELLO.ORG, http://www.monticello.org/ 
site/jefferson/quotations-jefferson-memorial#Inscription_under_ the_Dome (last visited Mar. 
3, 2015). 
138 McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 877 (2005). 
139 In fact, even after 1945, some Supreme Court opinions rejected the total separation 
theory espoused by those who claimed that the post-1945 precedents supported that view.  
See, e.g., supra notes 5 & 6 and accompanying text. 
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justices because those earlier decisions were to the contrary.  Particu-
larly, as those earlier decisions were written by Justices who either 
lived through (and even, to some extent, participated in) the ratifica-
tion of the Religion Clauses, or close to that event, it is preposterous 
for current Justices to ignore them to claim stare decisis support from 
very recent decisions that themselves ignored the stare decisis effect 
of prior opinions. 
The Supreme Court, in 1815,140 was required to apply the 
Virginia Bill of Rights, often regarded as the forerunner of the Bill of 
Rights in the U.S. Constitution.  It construed the Virginia Bill of 
Rights as mandating the “free exercise of religion according to the 
dictates-of-conscience,” while it prohibited the State from “creat[ing] 
or continu[ing] a religious establishment which should have exclusive 
rights and prerogatives, or compel[ling] the citizens to worship under 
a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those whose creed 
they could not conscientiously believe.”141  Essentially, as thus con-
strued by the Court, the Virginia Constitution had both Free Exercise 
and Establishment Clauses, providing the same protections as the two 
Religion Clauses in the Federal Bill of Rights.  And construing those 
provisions, the Supreme Court, only 24 years after the adoption of the 
Federal Bill of Rights, held that they did not prohibit the Government 
from “aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to per-
form their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the sup-
port of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of churches, 
or for the sepulture of the dead.”142  Significantly, this unanimous 
opinion by the Court, allowing government aid to all religions (and 
implicitly to God) as long as all sects are treated indiscriminately, 
was written by Justice Story, who, as noted above, wrote the first 
treatise on the U.S. Constitution. 
Again, in 1844, Justice Story wrote for another unanimous 
Court,143 construing Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the 
Pennsylvania State Constitution, which provided “all men have a nat-
ural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences . . . and no preference shall ever be 
given by law to any religious establishment or modes of wor-
 
140 Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815). 
141 Id. at 48-49. 
142 Id. at 49. 
143 Vidal v. Girard’s Ex’rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 183 (1844). 
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ship”144—again akin to the Federal Religion Clauses.  The Court 
there considered the validity, under those Constitutional clauses, of a 
bequest to the City of Philadelphia for the construction of a col-
lege.145  The bequest contained a prohibition against the City’s allow-
ing any “ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any sect whatsoever . 
. . [to] hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said col-
lege.”146  The objection raised to the bequest was that it violated the 
“Free Exercise” Clause, in being “derogatory and hostile to the Chris-
tian religion, and so is void . . .  [in] excluding . . . all instruction in 
the Christian religion.”147  In rejecting that objection, the Court read 
the testator’s condition as allowing Christianity to be “taught in the 
college.”148  It thereby made clear that neither the Establishment nor 
the Free Exercise Clause prohibited a government from establishing a 
college at which “the Bible” can be “read and taught as a divine reve-
lation in the college . . . [with] its general precepts expounded, its ev-
idences explained, and its glorious principles of morality inculcat-
ed.”149 
That the Supreme Court construed the Religion Clauses as 
distinguishing between “religion”—with which the Government 
could not interfere—and “God”—which our Constitution permitted 
the Government to recognize and esteem; was made clear in two 
unanimous Supreme Court opinions in 1878 and 1890.150  Both deci-
sions upheld laws prohibiting polygamy against assertions that those 
laws violated a Mormon’s free exercise of religion.  The Court, not-
ing that “[t]he word ‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution,”151 
quoted Jefferson’s explanation that “religion is a matter which lies 
solely between man and his God,”152 i.e., that religion is the avenue 
chosen by each individual to reach God.  With that definition, the 
First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion does 
not reach the worship of God.  This distinction between “religion” 
 
144 Id. at 198 (quoting PA. CONST. art. 1, § 3). 
145 Id. at 130-32. 
146 Id. at 132-33. 
147 Id. at 197. 
148 Vidal, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 199. 
149 Id. at 200. 
150 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
151 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162. 
152 Id. at 164 (quoting Jefferson’s reply to the Danbury Baptist Association (on or before 
Dec. 31, 1801)).  It was in this context and with this meaning that Jefferson used the phrase 
“a wall of separation between Church and State.”  See supra note 103. 
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and “God” was effectively reiterated in the Court’s second polygamy 
ruling in 1890,153 in which the Court referred to and upheld the First 
Amendment’s recognition of God, “one’s . . . Creator,” and “his 
Maker,” while “prohibit[ing] legislation for the support of any reli-
gious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect.”154 
The Court, in a unanimous 1892 opinion, held that the First 
Amendment, among other controlling ideologies, “affirm[s] and reaf-
firm[s] that this is a religious nation,”155 and “contains language 
which . . . recognizes a profound reverence for religion, and an as-
sumption that its influence in all human affairs is essential to the 
well-being of the community.”156  Although the Court recognized that 
each of the State Constitutions had provisions similar to the First 
Amendment religion clauses,157 it held that nothing prohibited the 
legislature of any State from exercising “power to authorize and re-
quire . . . the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies poli-
tic or religious societies to make suitable provision . . . for the institu-
tion of the public worship of God.”158 
The final unanimous decision rendered by the Court in the 
nineteenth century, in 1899, upheld as not violative of the Establish-
ment Clause, Congress’s appropriation of funds for construction of a 
building to be owned and operated by “a monastic order or sisterhood 
of the Roman Catholic Church.”159  The Court found nothing uncon-
stitutional in taxpayers’ money financing a hospital “[t]o be conduct-
ed under . . . the influence or patronage of that church” as long as its 
“powers are to be exercised in favor of anyone seeking the ministra-
tions of that kind of an institution.”160 
A final pre-1945 Supreme Court decision on the Religion 
Clauses involved Oregon’s attempt to enforce its Compulsory Educa-
tion Act to require all children to attend public schools,161 rather than 
parochial schools in which, in addition to those “subjects usually pur-
sued in Oregon public schools . . . . Systematic religious instruction 
 
153 Davis, 133 U.S. at 333. 
154 Id. at 342. 
155 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 470 (1892). 
156 Id. at 468. 
157 Id. at 470. 
158 Id. at 469. 
159 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 292, 299-300 (1899). 
160 Id. at 296-300. 
161 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 
529-30 (1925). 
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and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic 
Church are also regularly provided.”162  The Supreme Court rejected 
Oregon’s statute as one that “unreasonably interferes with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of 
children,”163 which included implicitly the parents’ right to engage in 
free religious exercise teaching of their children, and thus require 
Government assistance of all religions by arranging for students to be 
excused from public schools to attend parochial schools. 
Hence, every Supreme Court decision, each of which was 
unanimous, preceding 1945—the year utilized by some more modern 
day Justices as the commencement of Supreme Court decisions to be 
considered for stare decisis controlling precedent—concluded that the 
Religion Clauses permitted Government recognition of God and as-
sistance to religions, as long as the assistance was not given in a 
manner to prefer one religion over the others.  It is therefore not sur-
prising that modern-day Justices who attempt to read the contrary in-
to the First Amendment should seek to ignore this large number of 
Supreme Court rulings, much closer in time to the enactment of the 
First Amendment that, if considered for stare decisis effect, would 
require total rejection of their God, religion, and State separation 
view.  But ignoring those earlier announced rulings on the Religion 
Clauses cannot obliterate them to any fair-minded observer or Justice 
abiding by stare decisis obligations. 
Ignoring them must be construed as the improper substitution, 
by some contemporary Justices, of their personal views of what they 
think the Constitution should say for what the Constitution does say, 
and was intended to mean.  When contemporary Justices do so, they 
violate the Constitution itself, as defined in the Federalist Papers—
recognized as the Bible of the meaning and intent of the Constitution.  
Judges were not to “substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional 
intentions” and “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is 
indispensable that [judges] should be bound down by strict rules and 
precedents.”164  Moreover, they destroy the stare decisis doctrine that, 
as Justice John Marshall Harlan explained, is an essential component 
of the rule of law: “It certainly has never been a postulate of judicial 
power that mere altered disposition, or subsequent membership on 
 
162 Id. at 530-32. 
163 Id. at 534-35. 
164 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis added). 
27
Walpin: Freedom from Religion
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
214 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
the Court, is sufficient warrant for overturning a deliberately decided 
rule of Constitutional law.”165 
 
G. Analyzing the Irrationality of Some More 
Contemporary Contrary Rulings 
Given all the above facts—including the meaning of the Reli-
gion Clauses, the words and acts of its authors, how the Clauses were 
construed by the people who ratified them, Government conduct un-
der them, and the earlier Supreme Court decisions—the error in some 
contemporary Justices’ holding that absolute separation of God and 
religion from government is constitutionally required is made obvi-
ous. 
It is also worthwhile to consider a few examples of the “rea-
soning” of those Justices.  Justice O’Connor, who, while on the 
Court, swung from one side of the issue to the other, sought to ration-
alize how it was that “[t]he Court has permitted government, in some 
instances, to refer to or commemorate religion in public life. . . . 
[A]lthough these references speak in the language of religious belief, 
they are more properly understood as employing the idiom for essen-
tially secular purposes.”166  This is a classic Orwellian doublethink, 
akin to Orwell’s “war is peace” and “freedom is slavery”: as “secu-
lar” is defined as “[d]enoting attitudes, activities, or other things that 
have no religious or spiritual basis,”167 an expressed belief in and 
prayer to God cannot be “essentially secular.”  Further, any atheist or 
Buddhist—non-believers in the Judeo-Christian God—would find it 
totally religious, as the Court itself has held.168  Her use of the word 
“idiom” to attempt to clothe God in a non-religious appearance is, in 
itself, incomprehensible.  An idiom is defined as “an expression that 
cannot be understood from the meanings of its separate words but 
that has a separate meaning of its own.”169  When God—a single 
 
165 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
166 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
167 Secular Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/defini-
tion/american_english/secular (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
168 Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313; Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 213; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
675. 
169 Idiom Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dict-
ionary/idiom (last visited Mar. 3, 2015). 
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word, not an expression—is prayed to or revered and acknowledged 
as the Creator, as has been approved by the Court, the meaning of 
“God” is readily deducible. 
Justice O’Connor, in a 2004 Supreme Court case in which a 
parent challenged the constitutionality of a school district’s policy re-
quiring teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, expressed 
Orwellian rationalizations stating, “[f]acially religious references can 
serve . . . the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occa-
sions . . . instead of to invoke divine provenance.  The reasonable ob-
server . . . would not perceive these acknowledgements as signifying 
a government endorsement of . . . religion over nonreligion.”170 
What reasonable observer would ignore that asking Ameri-
cans to join in a prayer to God is anything but a government en-
dorsement of a belief in God, over atheistic beliefs, and thus an en-
dorsement of religion, of which God is generally recognized as a 
necessary component?  And then she employed the label “ceremonial 
deism.”171  Does she use the word “ceremonial” to mean “meaning-
less formalism” or “secular”?  Either way, she would be insulting all 
believers in God—most Americans172—contrary to the atheists who 
believe in no God.  Another basic fallacy in her Orwellian reasoning 
is her failure to explain—impossible to do—why inclusion of “God” 
was necessary “to solemnize public occasions.”173  If people did not 
believe in God, a public occasion could be solemnized without the 
mention of God; it is because, as the Court has previously declared, 
“this is a religious nation,” and that “we are a religious people,”174 
and that Presidents, Congress, and the Supreme Court regularly seek 
the help of God. 
Beyond ignoring all earlier relevant precedents, the currently 
existing confusion on the Religion Clauses is underlined by the more 
recent Justices’ difficulty in reaching agreement among themselves.  
 
170 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 36. 
171 Id. at 37. 
172 See Susan Jones, Poll: Americans’ Belief in God Is Strong—But Declining, 
CNSNEWS.COM (Dec. 17, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-
jones/poll-americans-belief-god-strong-declining (noting that 74% of adult Americans be-
lieve in God); see also Larry Shannon-Missal, Americans’ Belief in God, Miracles and 
Heaven Declines, HARRIS POLL (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/News 
Room/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/1508/ArticleId/1353/Default.a
spx. 
173 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 36. 
174 E.g., Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 470; Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 213 
(citing Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313). 
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During the past approximately 50 years, they have issued at least ten 
major opinions on the Religion Clauses in which they split 5-4.  
Those 5-4 decisions are epitomized by a single 107-page decision 
that contained eight separate opinions, attempting to explain the re-
sult of a 5-4 ruling and holding unconstitutional the display of a 
crèche, while splitting 6-3 and holding constitutional the display of a 
Menorah.175  The existence of this split—and add the fact that the 
lower court judges split 2-2—demonstrates the Court’s inability even 
to reach a meaningful consensus on the Religion Clauses.  This split 
also belies the test offered by Justice Harry Blackmun, after concur-
ring to make a five-Justice vote, that constitutionality must be based 
on “the standard of a ‘reasonable observer.’ ”176  It seems impossible 
for nine Justices to determine how a “reasonable observer” would 
view the display as pro-religion or pro-secular, when these intelli-
gent, knowledgeable judges are almost evenly split.  Who is to call 
unreasonable, either the five or the four Justices—some often chang-
ing sides of that split?  Indeed, at least six of the Justices recognized 
this impossibility of finding reasonableness when they traded charges 
that both sides were “using little more than intuition and a tape meas-
ure” to reach their respective conclusions.177 
The worst impact of the Court’s reliance on such evaluative 
measures as “the reasonable observer” is that, as Justice Ginsburg re-
cently commented in another “free exercise” decision, there is “[n]ot 
much help there for the lower courts bound by today’s decision.”178 
Both sides of the issue utter assertions for their respective po-
sitions, often devoid of reason or reality.  For example, in a 1983 rul-
ing holding constitutional the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of 
opening each day with a prayer by a chaplain paid for by the State, 
the majority asserted, apparently resting on its own say-so: “To in-
voke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the 
laws is . . . simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held 
among the people of this country.”179  Given the number of atheists 
(and others who do not believe in God) who have commenced law-
suits to prevent such prayers to God, this Court’s assertion simply ig-
 
175 Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578-79. 
176 Id. at 620. 
177 Id. at 608. 
178 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
179 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
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nores reality.  Atheists and other non-believers do not consider such 
practices to be a tolerable rejection of their beliefs.  I hasten to note, 
however, that their objection should not carry the day, as such recog-
nition of God is consistent with the Religion Clauses’ words and in-
tent; it is simply unfortunate that some Justices refuse to base their 
decisions on that unimpeachable basis. 
The dissent in that case was no better, basing its position on 
the conclusory assertion that the “First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion,”180 with-
out any attempt to reconcile that assertion with the over 200 years of 
recognition of thanks and prayers to God by every branch of Gov-
ernment, including their own, which they hear opening every Court 
session day. 
In Lee v. Weisman,181 a five-Justice majority held unconstitu-
tional a non-sectarian short invocation and short benediction by a 
Rabbi at a public school graduation.182  In so doing, the five Justices 
held that the Establishment Clause obliterated rights of individuals 
under the Free Exercise Clause.  That majority recognized that the 
student body and their parents clashed on the desirability of these 
opening and closing prayers to God.  “[M]any of [Plaintiff’s] class-
mates” sought to invoke the free exercise clause for what they con-
sidered to be “a spiritual imperative,” while the two non-believing 
plaintiffs asserted that it forced them into “religious conformity,” in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.183  Without attempting to rec-
ognize and reconcile these co-equal provisions of the First Amend-
ment, this Court majority simply eradicated the Free Exercise rights 
of the great majority of students, supposedly to protect against a vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause rights of these two plaintiffs.184 
The only way to give effect to both Clauses is to recognize the 
Establishment Clause as its authors understood it: to prevent estab-
lishment of a government religion, while not preventing people from 
speaking freely, in all contexts, of their faith, and certainly not to 
prevent homage to God—as this Rabbi’s prayers were limited.  This 
 
180 Id. at 802 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 
(1968)). 
181 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
182 Id. at 599. 
183 Id. at 595-96. 
184 Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 312 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (declaring that there is 
“a substantial free exercise claim on the part of those who affirmatively desire to have their 
children’s school day open with the reading of passages from the Bible”). 
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restriction was contrary to the meaning of the Free Exercise clause, 
recently well-defined by Justice Anthony Kennedy as “implicat[ing] 
more than just freedom of belief.  It means, too, the right to express 
those beliefs and to establish one’s religious (or nonreligious) self-
definition in the political, civic, and economic life of our larger 
community.”185  That “civic life” and “larger community” include 
events in school. 
The Free Exercise Clause was carefully written to be symmet-
rical to the immediately following clause against any law “abridging 
the freedom of speech.”  They should be Court-treated in the same 
manner, consistent with the Court’s declaration that each “of the 
great liberties insured by the First Article” must be equally enforced, 
with none “given higher place than the others.”186  It is axiomatic 
that, if a person is called upon to speak, the First Amendment bars 
Government interference with that free speech.  That freedom to 
speak may not be barred even when the speaker was to speak on a 
subject that might make some of the audience uncomfortable, or even 
that some might find offensive—and that includes all subjects, in-
cluding God, religion, and abortion, a subject having religious and 
emotional impact.  The Court has many times made clear that the 
right to express one’s views must be protected over offense to and 
dislike by others.187  The First Amendment right to the “free exercise” 
of religion deserves similar treatment.188 
The First Amendment protects students in school as well.189  
The Equal Access Act prohibits a “public secondary school” from 
taking action “against [any] students who wish to” talk about “reli-
gious, political, philosophical, or other content” to other students.190  
If a school is so prohibited from interfering with a student’s right to 
talk about religious subjects by statute, a fortiori the First Amend-
ment protection of freedom of speech must likewise have that effect, 
particularly given that “religious worship and discussion . . . are 
forms of speech and association protected by the First Amend-
 
185 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
186 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 50 n.35 (1985) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
164 (1944)). 
187 E.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-17 (1939); accord Tinker, 
393 U.S. at 509. 
188 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting with approval Bd. of Educ. of 
Westside Cmty Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
189 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
190 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(a) and (b)(1984)). 
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ment.”191  Thus, if a State refused to allow a student to speak on reli-
gion when she is authorized to speak on her choice of subjects, “then 
it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward religion.”192 
The Court’s 2000 decision barring students from voting (by 
secret ballot) to determine if they want to have a non-sectarian prayer 
at a football game, and, if so, democratically choosing the student 
speaker, is illogical and impractical; the ruling would not prevent the 
valedictorian at the school graduation, or even a student allowed to 
speak at a football game, from exercising her First Amendment free 
speech right to announce that she has been forbidden to voice a pray-
er, and therefore will not, but then proceeds to explain why this deci-
sion was wrong, and encourages everyone quietly to search their col-
lective conscience about the matter . . . for a few seconds.  
Realistically, that would provoke prayers from many students for a 
change of ruling to allow them to return to God. 
Justice John Paul Stevens, a strong supporter of the absolute 
separation construction of the Establishment Clause, also typified the 
illogic of that position.  According to him, “when public officials de-
liver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclu-
sively a transmission from the government . . . [but are] the inherent-
ly personal views of the speaker as an individual.”193  Most amazing 
is Justice Stevens’ assertion that a recognition of and request to all 
Americans to join in a prayer to God are treated as “personal” not 
Government, views, even when voiced by the President or other top 
Government officials, as thus permitted by his view of the Establish-
ment Clause, while a student-given invocation at a football game or a 
Rabbi-led invocation at a graduation must be construed to represent 
the Government speaking, and are thus prohibited.  I suggest that 
most reasonable observers would more likely look upon the President 
as speaking for the Government, and that an individual student or an 
individual Rabbi is not, but rather expressing personal views.  But 
this convoluted reasoning is essential to many Justices’ crusade to 
apply the First Amendment as freeing America from religion. 
 
191 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). 
192 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248. 
193 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 723 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
33
Walpin: Freedom from Religion
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015
220 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 31 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
This analysis demonstrates that the Court—most often by a 
slim 5-4 vote—has departed from what the authors of the First 
Amendment intended in enacting the Religion Clauses, leaving, as 
Justice Thomas’ concluded, “our Establishment Clause . . . is in 
hopeless disarray.”194  We should now, as Justice Thomas recom-
mended, “begin the process of rethinking the Establishment 
Clause”195 to, I would add, return jurisprudence on both Religion 
Clauses to their original meaning as understood by their authors and 
those who ratified them: guaranteeing freedom of religion. 
 
 
194 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
195 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 542 U.S. at 45 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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